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Law in a Reign of Terror 
Alan Watson 
I 
From David Daube I learned Roman law and many other things: inter alia 
that accepted doctrines and approaches need continual re-examination, that 
research in one field may illumine another, that limitations because of one's 
background or upbringing, or in one's academic skills affect one's judg- 
ment,1 and that the connection between life and law is more complex than is 
usually supposed. A paper dedicated to a beloved and revered master may 
properly strike a more personal-though not less scholarly-note than is 
usual; especially when the theme concerns tyranny and the recipient has 
experienced tyranny and withstood it mightily. 
II 
A few years ago I published a book, The Nature of Law,2 which was 
activated primarily by three long held beliefs. First, law is a means, not an 
end in itself; and legal rules, principles, decisions do not come into being 
without some purpose. The end envisaged for a legal rule or decision may be 
immediate-to give financial compensation to a particular victim of negli- 
gence, for instance-or more remote-to promote general happiness or 
bolster the economic dominance of the ruling class, for example-but that 
does not concern us here. What, in my opinion, does matter is that a general 
Alan Watson is a professor at the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania. For David 
Daube on his 75th birthday. 
1. For an express statement see D. Daube, 'Fashions and Idiosyncracies in the Exposition 
of the Roman Law of Property' Theories of Property, A. Parel and T. Flanagan, eds., 
(Waterloo, Ont. 1979), p. 35; also R. Yaron (a fellow disciple), 'Semitic Elements in 
Early Rome' Daube noster, A. Watson, ed., (Edinburgh, 1974), pp. 343 ff at p. 346. 
2. (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1977). 
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theory of the law that excludes consideration of what a law does ignores the 
heart of the law. Secondly, law is a human construct, a concept, and as such 
can best be analysed cross-culturally. Just as an analysis of the concept of 
religion would be unduly limited, unbalanced and probably misleading if it 
were restricted to an examination of 'orthodox' Christianity and did not 
consider primitive Christianity, Hinduism or Buddhism, so it is over- 
narrowed and distorting to restrict one's enquiry on the nature of law to the 
moder Western legal tradition. Thirdly, a complete theory of law may be 
descriptive and be restricted to what law is, not also what law ought to be; or 
alternatively, a theory of law must keep rigorously apart what law is from 
what law ought to be. Since law is a means, one might claim that a complete 
theory of law may be restricted to what law does, not also what law ought to 
do; and the theory must then keep rigorously apart what law does from what 
law ought to do.3 It is dangerous in the extreme, I believe, to attribute to 
law, as it is, the characteristics of law as it ought to be and give law, as it is, 
the appropriate respect and obedience. Habent suafata libelli: alas, readers 
seem not to have noticed my aim of demystifying the law. 
The present paper builds on my book and may be regarded as an appendix 
or as an additional chapter. Its theme is that in actual fact the nature of law is 
highlighted when it is used by tyrants. Since I rely on my conclusions in the 
book for what is necessary for, or typical (for Westerners) of, law I have to 
refer constantly to the book, but the paper should be comprehensible by 
itself and is basically independent. Indeed, there is a positive advantage in 
keeping the book and the paper distinct. The conclusions in the book on the 
necessary and typical features of law were reached without dependence on 
the appearance of law in a tyranny. And the book is not used here to justify 
arguments about law in a tyranny. 
III 
In The Nature of Law I argued that the sole necessary and distinguishing 
feature of law was the availability of an institutionalized process that had the 
specific object of inhibiting further unregulated conflict; and I offered as a 
definition of law: 
Law is the means adopted to institutionalize disputes and to validate decisions 
given in the appropriate process, that has the specific object of inhibiting 
further unregulated conflict.4 
Thus, the appropriate or applicable legal rules need not determine the out- 
come of the process nor need the facts be established and the law applied to 
them. But a claim of this thing we call law is necessary to bring the process 
3. Cf. Nature of Law, pp. 4ff. 
4. Nature of Law, pp. Iff. 
164 
Law and the Reign of Terror 
into being and the law is used to validate or justify the decision. (By process 
I mean what Westerners would regard as the trial, but the notion is wider.)5 
During a Reign of Terror, such as occurred in the French Revolution, in 
the Soviet Union under Stalin and in Nazi Germany, the process with its 
validation from legal rules becomes more prominent, the application of legal 
rules to facts less so. Very great attention may be paid to having the decision 
validated by the law. In 'show trials' above all, the appearance of correct 
legal behavior by the authorities is maintained. The accused may be tortured 
or brain-washed until they confess to crimes (they did not commit) es- 
tablished by law, and the confession will justify the verdict. There is a link 
between tyrants' appalling behavior and their sense (or need) of dignity, 
decorum and honor. They meet their need by using law. The process, I 
argued, has the specific object of inhibiting further unregulated conflict. 
That is again nowhere clearer than in show trials for political crimes in a 
Reign of Terror. Not only are the accused certain to be condemned to a 
punishment so severe that they cannot be a threat to the order of the State, 
but the process is meant to teach others, who will learn what the State 
regards as distruptive of order, and will know that the State is able and 
willing to restrain disruptive behavior. For the educating role of the process, 
intended to inhibit further unregulated conflict, the guilt or innocence of the 
defendants is irrelevant.6 
I also argued that there is a complex but not arbitrary relationship between 
law and force or violence. Law (at any rate, in the case of a territorial State) 
relies for its existence on its support from violence; or, at least, to be 
effective law is usually supplied with support by violence. Again, law 
determines what violence is lawful and what is unlawful. It is the strongest 
force, or the force that controls or keeps in check other forces that fixes both 
what is law and what the law is, and also what violence is outside of the law. 
This has to be, precisely because the institutionalized process-which is the 
distinguishing feature of law-has the specific object of inhibiting further 
unregulated conflict. The process cannot achieve this object unless it is 
backed by the strongest force.7 
In a Reign of Terror the naked violence backing the trial is very obvious 
(both to the insider and the enquirer at a distance) as is the fact that the 
process is in the hands of the strongest force. In a special sense law is 
connected with violence in this instance since law is being used as a weapon 
by the greatest force precisely to weaken other forces. 
A further feature of law, I claimed, is that law is treated as worthy of 
respect, independently of any quality inherent in the rules themselves.8 This 
5. Nature of Law, pp. 31ff. 
6. For the situation where a government wishes to incite dissidents to internal violence see 
Nature of Law, p. 14. 
7. Nature of Law, p. 73. 
8. Nature of Law, p. 114ff. 
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manifests itself in various ways during a Reign of Terror. First, the powerful 
State prefers to make use of law and legal process to crush its enemies when 
it could just as easily proceed simply by exercising violence. 'Just as easily' 
in this sentence requires immediate qualification in a way that brings out 
vividly the power, value or nature of law. The words 'just as easily' apply 
only to the crushing of immediate enemies. Additional courage is required 
from tyrants who use open, naked violence: the color of law provides 
legitimation. Victims of naked violence receive more sympathy than victims 
of law: law is respected. The notion 'Law must be obeyed' will deter some 
from attacking a government, when they would feel justified rebelling in the 
presence of open governmental violence. Secondly, the person, with a role 
in the trial, whether as judge, prosecutor or defense counsel, fulfills his 
office with complete seriousness as if unaware, as some may well be, that 
any law involved is unjust and biased, the charges unfounded, the evidence 
fabricated, and the verdict inevitable. Thirdly, an accused may respond with 
shame-even if the charges are unfounded, just as if he were guilty of 
betraying the revolution.9 
This curious respect for law because it is law, independently of its quali- 
ties, emerged in a marked way after Iranian revolutionaries seized hostages 
in the American embassy in Teheran in 1979. The involvement of the 
Iranian government in the seizure and retention of hostages was contrary to 
both Islamic law and International Law. The Iranians repeatedly threatened 
to put Americans on trial as spies. They wished, in fact, to provide a legal 
justification for their behavior. The threat of such a trial produced a sense of 
outrage among the American people, different from but possibly as great as 
any threat simply to kill the hostages. The sense of outrage was, I suggest, 
partly a response to the idea that law would be abused but possibly even 
more to the anxiety that the Iranian government could make the seizure seem 
legal under Iranian law. 
Yet another marked trait of law is the great scope that it gives to discre- 
tion, whether the discretion is that of the parties, the judge or the execu- 
tive. 0 Nowhere is legal discretion more marked than in a Reign of Terror 
when free play may be given to favored individuals to commit certain crimes 
when others may be arrested and severely punished for trivialities. 
Finally, justice is one thing, and legal rules and their application quite 
another. Nowhere else than in a Reign of Terror is the absence of a neces- 
sary connection between law and justice so potent. 
IV 
In The Nature of Law I said a little about obedience to the law and about 
the relationship between law and justice. I would like to add to that account. 
9. For examples for this paragraph see e.g. R. Conquest, The Great Terror, (London, 
Macmillan, 1968), pp. 82ff, 116f. 
10. See A. Watson, 'Comparative Law and Legal Change' Cambridge Law Journal 37 
(1978), pp. 313ff at pp. 328ff. 
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There was, I maintained, no inevitable connection between law and justice 
though law has an inherent tendency towards the moral.11 For the latter 
point I argued inter alia that to institutionalize disputes, to validate decisions 
on the disputes, to inhibit further unregulated conflict are all moral objec- 
tives; that most legal rules when they are made, and legal decisions when 
they are pronounced, have no direct effect for good or evil on the legislator 
or judge who will accordingly choose for justice (as he sees it) rather than 
injustice; that even in a tyrannous state the tyranny need be apparent in 
relatively few laws, and that law is society's attempt to institutionalize 
justice. In addition, I argued, when a legal system is thought unjust by the 
members of the society, then the decisions made in the processes lose public 
support, and the processes cannot fulfill their essential function of inhibiting 
further unregulated conflict. (All this, of course, depends on the absence of 
the availability of even greater force on the side of the state.) For John R. 
Lucas this is to put the cart before the horse: 'Legal processes are not 
governed by the rule of law in order to secure public acceptability, but are 
accepted by the public, if they conform to the rule of law, because that, in 
the public understanding, is part of the nature of law'.12 Elsewhere he shows 
that for him there is a conceptual link between the statements 'This is the 
law' and 'This ought to be obeyed'; and thus for him an unjust law is 
law-since 'many injustices ought to be put up with'-but a very unjust law 
is not law because 'grave and gross injustice strikes at the raison d'etre of 
law'. 3 The problem of the connection between obedience (which occupies 
an important place in thinking about law), justice and law is crucial but no 
positivist could easily accept the notion that a very unjust law is not law.'4 I 
would prefer to build on a foundation laid by Francis Bacon: 
In civil society either law or force prevails. But there is a kind of force that 
apes law; and law sometimes smacks more of force than of legal equity. The 
source of injustice is therefore three-fold: mere force, wicked ensnarement in 
the guise of law; and savagery of law itself.15 
In the absence of law there can be no justice: not in the sense that there can 
be no theory of what it is to be just; but in the sense that in civil society there 
can be no assurance or faith that other persons will act justly, and no 
recourse against injustice except force. But law also can be used unjustly or 
be itself unjust. Hence law is a necessary but not sufficient condition of 
justice in society. 
But law is a necessary condition for justice in society only because it 
provides a framework of order. Fundamentally that is to say law is about 
11. Pp. 125ff. 
12. Philosophica, 23 (1979), pp. 45f. 
13. On Justice (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980, p. 123). 
14. Though that may be a failing in legal positivism. 
15. My translation of Aphorismus 1 in his De Justitia Universali. 
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order not justice.16 It is primarily in the connection between order and law 
rather than between justice and law that we should cite any discussion of 
obedience and law. 17 The argument may be set out briefly in three series of 
propositions. To begin with 
1. Law is essentially about order. 
2. Order is a good; but a relative rather than absolute good. 
3. Law is habitually obeyed. 
4. Law ought to be obeyed insofar as the obedience is conducive to order and 
insofar as the order in this instance is a good thing. 
The second set of propositions is: 
a. Justice is a good, and injustice is an evil. 
b. Law has a tendency towards the just. 
c. Just law ought to be obeyed. 
The third set of propositions results from combining the first two: 
i. An unjust law ought not to be obeyed if disobedience would have no effect 
upon order. 
ii. An unjust law ought not to be obeyed if disobedience would have an 
adverse effect upon order and if, in this instance, the order is a bad thing. 
iii. An unjust law ought to be obeyed only if the harm resulting from any 
disobedience to order, which in this instance is a good thing, is greater 
than the harm resulting from the injustice. 
If the above argument is correct then there is, even apart from the internal 
view of those controlling the legal system, an obligation to obey the law, 
and this obligation is a moral one, but it is not absolute. There is, therefore, 
a conceptual link between the statement 'This is the law' and 'This ought to 
be obeyed'. But the link may snap on occasion-or frequently, in a Reign of 
Terror-without the law ceasing to be law.18 There is no need to claim lex 
injustissima non est lex. 
V 
Habent sua fata libelli. May readers draw their own conclusions from the fact 
that the nature of law emerges with great vividness under the Reign of Terror.19 
16. Nature of Law, passim. 
17. Nature of Law, pp. 127f. 
18. At least this is so for positivists. 
19. I am grateful to my friends, Calum Carmichael and Dru Cornell, for helpful criticism. 
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